SURVEY-107: Phased Remediation and Dust Considerations for the Convenience Class

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SURVEY-107: Phased Remediation and Dust Considerations for the Convenience Class

Summary

As part of Radiant DAO’s ongoing commitment to equitable remediation and long-term sustainability, the DAO proposes a phased remediation plan for the Convenience Class, defined as users with net deposits between $10 and $1,000 at the time of March 11th conversion.

This plan introduces a structured, tranche-based approach to distributing funds, aligned with the DAO’s treasury management objectives, and overall protocol health.

Additionally, this proposal builds upon the prior community-approved Convenience Class remediation vote and revisits the DAO’s previous definition of dust (balances ≤ $10), considering community feedback and new data regarding claim activity, user participation, current treasury conditions, and cost efficiency.

Importantly, this updated plan acknowledges that the DAO’s treasury is currently over-exposed to RDNT, with limited non-RDNT assets. Because paying remediation entirely in RDNT during a down-market period would require significant selling pressure—directly harming RDNT holders and degrading the DAO’s financial runway—a more measured, phased distribution is being recommended.

Despite this, the broader protocol outlook has improved. Radiant’s TVL has recovered from ~$3M at the post-exploit lows to consistently above $20M since November 3, 2025. This recovery reinforces the value of patience, fiscal restraint, and disciplined execution during remediation.

Rationale

1. Safeguarding Long-Term Protocol Health

Radiant’s recovery and growth depend on disciplined treasury management. The DAO remains fully committed to remediating affected users as per community consensus; however, this must be done responsibly, balancing the community’s expectations with operational and developmental sustainability.

A phased approach ensures the DAO can fulfill its obligations without compromising strategic initiatives such as:

  • Funding for innovation, audits, and new chain deployments

  • Treasury preservation amid evolving market dynamics

  • Sustained liquidity and protocol resilience for the RDNT token

2. Managing Cash Flow and Market Volatility

The DAO’s treasury is finite, and its income sources remain tied to market performance and protocol activity. Implementing a phased distribution schedule reduces exposure to adverse conditions such as:

  • Liquidity crunches

  • Market volatility affecting RDNT

  • Temporal imbalances in DAO cash flow

Each tranche is designed to match the DAO’s financial capacity at that time.

3. Protecting RDNT Market Depth

RDNT market health remains a key strategic priority. By carefully managing token emissions through phased remediation, the DAO can help preserve liquidity depth and prevent undue downward pressure. This disciplined pacing ensures that the DAO’s commitments are met while protecting RDNT’s long-term price stability and market structure.

Proposed Distribution Schedule

The DAO proposes to execute remediation for the Convenience Class through seven tranches, broadly equal in aggregate value, based on net deposit size.

Tranche Eligibility Range (USD) Estimated Timing
Tranche 1 $750 – $1,000 Q1 2026
Tranche 2 $500 – $750 Q2 2026
Tranche 3 $250 – $500 Q3 2026
Tranche 4 $100 – $250 TBD
Tranche 5 $50 – $100 TBD
Tranche 6 $25 – $50 TBD
Tranche 7 $10 – $25 TBD

As Radiant’s revenue, treasury position, and Guardian Fund performance strengthen, later tranches may be accelerated based on DAO approval and on-chain data.

Dust Classification Review

The DAO previously established “dust” as balances ≤ $10, primarily based on claim contract gas efficiency. However, further community and advisor analysis revealed additional considerations warranting reevaluation.

Claim Inactivity

Data shows that as claim amounts decrease, claim delinquency rates would increase significantly. In other words, smaller claim values correlate with a higher probability that recipients will not engage with the Merkl distribution due to wallet inactivity.

Tranche Eligibility Range (USD) Inactivity (days)* Inactivity (%)** Claim Incentive Factor*** Estimated claimants (%)***
Tranche 1 $750 – $1,000 41.11296398 8.94% 0.90 81.95%
Tranche 2 $500 – $750 39.98324185 8.02% 0.80 73.58%
Tranche 3 $250 – $500 37.8675244 11.29% 0.65 57.66%
Tranche 4 $100 – $250 49.28989726 14.67% 0.50 42.67%
Tranche 5 $50 – $100 69.30405297 20.33% 0.35 27.88%
Tranche 6 $25 – $50 155.3536368 32.07% 0.20 13.59%
Tranche 7 $10 – $25 304.2530316 42.50% 0.08 4.60%

*Measured as median days passed since last activity on all EVM chains.

**Measured as % of wallets inactive (0 Txs) for at least 1 full year on all EVM chains.

***To forecast expected remediation participation across the Convenience Class, the DAO applies a claimant probability model based on (1) on-chain inactivity and (2) diminishing incentive to claim smaller balances.

Activity Score
ActivityScore=1−InactivityRate

Value-Adjusted Incentive Factor
Lower-value tranches exhibit materially reduced claim motivation even among active wallets. To reflect this, the DAO applies conservative incentive multipliers.

Estimated Claimants
EstimatedClaimants=ActivityScore×IncentiveFactor

Applying this model yields a steep decline in expected participation across lower tranches, with estimated claimant rates ranging from 82% in the top tranche to <5% for balances below $25. This supports a more efficient remediation strategy by recognizing that low-value distributions are overwhelmingly unclaimed and can be reasonably classified as dust.

Given this data, distributing funds to inactive wallets may not yield meaningful remediation results, leading to inefficiencies in both gas and treasury utilization.
Reallocating these funds toward higher-value tranches or protocol growth initiatives would create greater net community impact while maintaining fairness in execution.

Many wallets with extremely low balances are now inactive, lost, or abandoned. Distributing remediation to these addresses does not produce tangible community benefit and may instead result in dormant RDNT supply that is never circulated or utilized. Reclassifying such tranches as dust prevents treasury resources from being trapped in unproductive or unreachable addresses.

The spirit of the remediation effort is to meaningfully assist affected users, not to perform symbolic gestures that provide no practical benefit. By focusing on viable, claimable, and impactful distributions, the DAO honors community intent while respecting the operational limits of decentralized execution.

Building for Resilience and Renewal

This phased plan embodies Radiant DAO’s enduring ethos: community-first, sustainability-always. It ensures that remediation continues meaningfully, transparently, and responsibly, while reinforcing the DAO’s operational resilience and governance credibility. Through Radiant v3 and subsequent protocol iterations, the DAO seeks not only to remediate but also to rebuild stronger, with governance processes that reflect both empathy and fiscal discipline.

Next Steps

  • Discussion Period & Tempcheck Survey (2 Weeks): The DAO invites open community dialogue and feedback before formalizing the tranche execution schedule.

  • Governance Vote (2 Weeks): Upon conclusion of the discussion & tempcheck survey phase, a formal Snapshot vote will determine the final tranche structure and potential dust classification adjustments.

  • Implementation: Subject to approval, Tranche 1 distributions will commence in Q1 2026, with subsequent tranches following the proposed schedule or as modified by DAO decision.

Convenience Class Remediation Tempcheck Survey

This 2-week poll closes on 2025-12-09 at 23:59:00Z

Please select 1 option below whether the DAO should reshape the previously ratified convenience class remediation approach, and if so, how.

  • Option 1 — Approve Revised Distribution Schedule with Dust Reclassified as < $25 (Remove Tranche 7)
  • Option 2 — Approve Revised Distribution Schedule with Dust Reclassified as < $50 (Remove Tranches 6 & 7)
  • Option 3 — Approve Revised Distribution Schedule with Dust Reclassified as < $100 (Remove Tranches 5, 6 & 7)
  • Option 4 — Approve Revised Distribution Schedule with Dust Reclassified as < $250 (Remove Tranches 4, 5, 6 & 7)
  • Option 5 — Reject Proposal (Single Distribution When Appropriate, No Dust Reclassification)
0 voters
2

To me, anything that is unclaimed is a dead cost. RDNT is quite in a terrible spot and giving money to “dead” accounts is a burden that doesn’t make any sense.

Therefore not only i would go for option 4 (and i’d even add an option 4b, dust <500$); I would also put a very strict timelock on the claim contract.

The moment the dust settling of your tranche goes live you have X blocks to claim, 1-2 months at most. Any unclaimed amount goes to treasury, funneling the next (small) tranche and at least speeding up the cost for users who care

2 Likes
3

I really do not understand why you are chosing this route.
Why this “solution”. The Tranches order is more than sufficient! Tranches 4 through 7 have to wait indefinitely according to this plan anyway! How does this make Tranches 1 through 3 whole earlier?!

And then this absurd notion that <$250 is even remotely able to be considered “dust”! To who? Millionairs?!

Of course the people who lost the most >$250 will vote for this. Whoever came up with this idea of proclaiming $250 as dust, obviously has no clue how much this is for “regular people”. Is this project all about TVL instead of nr of users? “Small” users can be can also be your advocates you know. “Small” users can also become whales and want to park their money in trustworthy projects.

Yes, DeFi poses risks. But screwing over the little guy some more really makes things worse. Do you really believe that doing it this way is going to bring people back to Radiant (next cycle)?

We gave you trust even after the hack. Even excepted a 30% haircut. The idea with this remediation was to bring (back) trust into this project. But you are willing to throw so many users under the bus to help a few whales?
Do you think that will bring back users?

I am seriously dissapointed in this team for even considering this option.
Let alone putting it out for a vote!

2 Likes
4

I think the wording is really what’s throwing people off. Using the word “dust” makes it sound like $10–250 is insignificant, which is not what we meant at all. In hindsight, that was a poor choice of wording and gives the wrong impression.

The real issue is that most smaller wallets are inactive, and the claim rate for them is pretty low. For example, balances in the $10–25 range might only have a 5% claim rate. Even for $100–250 balances, we would probably only see 30–40% claimed. That means a lot of funds could end up sitting there, unproductive, for potentially years, waiting for claims that might never come.

So the argument isn’t “$200 is dust” or “small users don’t matter.” It’s about whether it makes sense for the DAO to hold $1M in claim contracts for years for wallets that may never claim at all. This is a limitation of both Merkl or any custom claim contract. We are waiting for other ideas or solutions.

Another idea (in the first reply) was to shorten the claim window to 1-2 months for each tranche, then reuse the funds for the next tranche, but that creates its own issues since most users don’t check in on Radiant much at all.

Anyway, we will adjust the wording so this is clearer going forward.

The reason we are surveying and then voting on this question is that these funds ultimately come from RDNT holders.

5

The definition of dust is completely subjective, and the tiniest of “dust users” can have an oversized impact on protocol promotion, sentiment, and growth overall. If the primary logic is to avoid sending funds to dead/abandoned wallets, then there should be a claim window that is the same for all convenience class users, with unclaimed funds either going back to the DAO, being distributed to other convenience class users to lighter the “haircut” burden, and/or kickstart the pot that will fund longer term remediation for users who are not in the convenience class. The statistics regarding claim size determining the possibility of user claims should not be a factor here— guesswork at best. Adapting a longer timeline for phasing distributions makes a lot of sense though. Just make it something that users must do themselves, and voila, the abandoned wallet problem is solved. How can anyone be sure that any one of the wallets with close to a zero balance currently isn’t a whale’s wallet — and that them getting their $10 back = happiness = major investment in Radiant…. Or conversely, NOT getting their $10 back = anger = never touching Radiant again. I may not be a whale or in the convenience class, but I know that getting even the smallest amount back for me would (versus being excluded entirely) would definitely raise the chances of me loading some liquidity back into Radiant, significantly.

So… I reject, but think that a new proposal needs to be brought forth, with a focus on the distribution timeline becoming sustainable, how to handle unclaimed funds (claim window), and completely remove any language regarding changes to dust. Dust is dust, but it’s if you take it away from users that think it dust as glitter, protocol beware!

6

Frankly, i don’t understand anything. I am not even sure if this is regarding the stolen funds in the last year hack (rwBTC, rweETH etc…) as i saw mentions of RDNT tokens.
All i know is that i lost 5 rweETH in this exploit/hack, i have voted a few months ago on a plan to make up for the losses. Since then i’ve been waiting to see what would happen, and i barely used my wallet as it was dedicated for such uses, but since most of my ETH was taken, i can’t use it as intended at first (hence my relative inactivity), but this doesn’t mean i don’t want my 5+ETH back and that i won’t claim anything, especially as this is a lot of “money” for me.
Then i don’t understand those “tranches”, as i lost a lot more than 1000$ (and others much more than me i assume), but i trust you regarding this.

All this to say that, reading this proposal is like reading a paper written by lawyers, or something like this, and i’m not English, how am i supposed to vote on something i don’t understand ?
I thought our lost funds would be “refilled/recovered” over time and we would have to be patient to get the full amount. And i can’t say that someone doesn’t deserve to be reimbursed because they didn’t use their wallets in the last months (maybe they are like me, had a dedicated wallet, and waited for news).

1 Like
7

nice idea

8

Sorry about your huge loss, friend. To summarize, this proposal, due to the market conditions and the treasury’s over exposure to RDNT, is only addressing the prioritized reimbursement of the convenience class, needing to stretch out the timeline and perhaps raising the eligibility threshold (what we have been clumsily calling dust). The community still intends to make losses > $1,000 whole with 1:1 in-kind assets, as long as it takes…

9

The limited claim window before rolling unclaimed funds forward to following tranches seems like a great idea. Also, I do think we’ve overstretched the use of the term dust. Perhaps eligibility threshold is a better term.

10

This is without exaggeration one of the worst proposals ever submitted by any DAO.

Radiant previously announced that remediation would be handled through the new RDNT treasury, funded by allocating a portion of protocol fees toward a remediation pool. Now, after holders have been waiting since October 2024—over a full year—this proposal suddenly appears, attempting to quietly delay remediation to Q1 2026 and beyond, with some categories not even receiving a clear end date.

This is unreasonable, unacceptable, and frankly a betrayal of the community’s patience and trust.

The most alarming part is the audacity to suggest discarding wallets purely because they fall under a “convenience class” or because someone assumes they are inactive based on statistical models. That is not remediation—it’s an attempt to sweep small investors under the rug and pretend their losses don’t matter.

The entire proposal reads as a sneaky, last-minute maneuver designed to skirt investor rights and reduce Radiant’s financial responsibility for a hack that occurred due to the protocol’s own security failures.

Radiant seems more focused on preserving treasury assets than honoring commitments to the people who were harmed. Instead of building trust, RDNT is signaling to the entire market—loud and clear—that small investors can be ignored, delayed, or written off entirely.

No wonder RDNT has struggled to recover since the hack. Investor confidence was already shaken, and proposals like this confirm why: Radiant is showing that it values penny-pinching over accountability, and treasury recovery over fairness.

This proposal is a brazen attempt to sidestep responsibility and leave the smallest victims behind simply because their balances are small—despite the fact that every affected wallet suffered loss due to Radiant’s inadequate contract protections.

Radiant claims to be building a long-term, trust-based protocol. This proposal does the opposite. It alienates the community, undermines faith in governance, and sends a message to future participants that Radiant will happily cut corners when it suits them.

This is not remediation.

It is not accountability.

It is a disgraceful effort to minimize the fallout at the expense of the very users Radiant claims to serve.

11

There are several fundamental problems with this reasoning.

  1. You cannot claim “low claim rates” when no claims exist yet and claim contracts are not even live.

Where exactly are these measured rates coming from?

They do not exist.

There has been zero opportunity for claim creation, so any numbers about “5% claim rate” or “30–40% claim rate” are fabricated assumptions, not data.

If you are using projections from other protocols, then:

• Why are you selectively applying them only to small wallets?

• Why not apply the same logic to large wallets, where inactivity or abandoned wallets may also exist?

The entire argument collapses because it is built on speculation, not evidence.

⸻

  1. Your definition of “inactive” is arbitrary, unexplained, and selectively applied.

How exactly are you defining inactivity?

• No wallet-activity for X months?

• No bridging?

• No swapping?

• No Radiant-specific interactions?

And why is this “inactivity filter” being used only to justify cuts to smaller wallets but not larger ones?

A governance process cannot pick and choose which users are considered “inactive” simply because their balances are smaller. That is not governance — it’s class-based discrimination disguised as protocol efficiency.

⸻

  1. Claim contracts do NOT need to remain open “for years” unless Radiant decides so.

This statement is misleading and intentionally frames the situation as if Radiant is forced into keeping $1M idle.

You can establish:

• A claim window (e.g., 6 months or 1 year)

• A sunset clause

• A post-window roll-over of unclaimed funds back to treasury

This is the simplest, most widely-used remediation model.

So the narrative that claim contracts for small wallets “must remain open for years” is factually false. It is a design choice, not a technical constraint.

⸻

  1. And even if the claim window were open for years, that is not a problem — it is a signal of integrity.

Holding funds to honor all users — including the smallest wallets — is exactly what builds trust in a protocol.

A protocol that says:

“Your losses matter, no matter the size,”

earns long-term loyalty.

Your argument implies the opposite: that Radiant wants convenience, not accountability.

That is not how you rebuild trust after a hack.

⸻

  1. “We.” Who exactly is “we”?

You keep referring to “we” as if Radiant leadership is speaking through community votes.

So let’s be very clear:

• Is this Radiant core team policy?

• Is this a community proposal?

• Or is this a poll where Radiant-aligned community managers influence outcomes?

Because from the outside, it increasingly appears that Radiant is using the DAO as a self-serving echo chamber, where surveys are posted, Radiant-aligned actors respond, and then Radiant cites the “results” as community sentiment.

If Radiant wants genuine governance credibility, transparency is required:

Who is “we”? What is Radiant’s official stance? And why does Radiant appear so disconnected from actual investor patience and sentiment?

12

The result of this pool is the mirror of greediness. 250$ dust? Please!!!

13

Thank you all for the feedback so far, both here and on Discord.
We will be incorporating your input and updating the proposal accordingly.

This is simply the feedback-gathering and temperature-check phase. The post was shared purely to gather feedback.

A lot of people have given negative feedback with good arguments, and I appreciate it.

The proposal isn’t moving forward in its current form; it’s going to be rewritten.

We are just talking things through in the form of a proposal. This isn’t on-chain voting, just a quick survey. Anyone is free to submit a proposal.

Ultimately, RDNT holders will make the final vote, but every idea and piece of feedback from the community is valued and will be reflected in the proposal.

15

I want to address Survey-107 again, now that the updates were quietly made after negative community feedback — without issuing a new survey, without restarting the vote, and without transparently resetting the governance process.

This makes the entire situation even more concerning.

  1. The biggest problem: The survey was amended after feedback but the vote was not restarted

Hung’s Telegram message openly confirms:

  • The title was changed
  • The wording (“dust” → “eligibility threshold”) was changed
  • New mechanics were added (rollover of unclaimed funds, 90-day window, etc.)
  • Multiple clarifications were added outside the survey area

Yet the survey itself was not re-issued.

The existing votes were not cleared.

The community was not given a clean slate.

The process was not restarted.

This is a fundamental violation of basic DAO voting integrity.

Once a vote has been materially changed, the vote must restart — otherwise voters are voting on a proposal that no longer exists in its original form.

Continuing the same poll after substantial edits is not governance — it is procedural theater.

  1. The survey pretends to be a “temp check,” but the next steps clearly show it is meant to become binding

Survey-107 explicitly states:

  • After the temp-check, it will go to Snapshot
  • After Snapshot, implementation begins

This means:

  • The survey is not exploratory
  • It is not an open-ended discussion
  • It is not a brainstorming session

It is the first step of a predetermined pipeline:

Survey → Snapshot → Implementation.

So when Hung says:

“Some options are just fodder… natural pruning will produce a stable version.”

This contradicts the actual architecture of the survey:

  • It is not a free-form discussion
  • It is not advisory
  • It is structured to produce a mandated outcome
  • The CC is treating it as a formal governance workflow

This is why the entire experience is misleading and feels like a show — a mechanism to ratify a decision already made.

  1. Changing the proposal after negative feedback — without issuing a new vote — proves that the team did not intend real debate

If the CC truly valued community input:

They would have paused the survey, rewritten it properly, posted a new version, opened a fresh comment window, and then initiated a brand-new vote.

Instead:

  • Feedback came in
  • Criticism escalated
  • The survey was stealth-modified
  • The vote was not restarted
  • The amended version was pushed forward anyway

That is not genuine governance.

That is performative consent-seeking, designed to give the appearance of community participation while ensuring the same outcome the CC already intended.

  1. The timing makes this look even more orchestrated

Q4 2025 was the publicly communicated and ratified remediation start timeframe.

And now, at the very end of Q4:

  • A new framework suddenly appears
  • The original timeline is replaced
  • New eligibility cutoffs are introduced
  • New mechanics are added
  • “Dust” is expanded
  • Convenience Class is pushed into 2026

If this were a good-faith adjustment, it would have been raised:

  • Mid-year
  • At Q3 updates
  • At least weeks before remediation deadlines

Instead, it appears at the last possible moment, which strongly suggests:

  • Radiant never intended to honor the Q4 2025 commitment
  • The “survey” is a retroactive justification
  • The new delays were pre-decided and are now being formalized
  • The community is being asked to rubber-stamp a pre-chosen outcome

This is why some people feel betrayed — not because of treasury concerns, but because of the method.

  1. The “Claim Inactivity” model is not neutral data — it is a constructed justification to deprioritize small wallets

Survey-107 attempts to establish a veneer of mathematical legitimacy by introducing a multi-step inactivity model that includes:

  • A table of “Inactivity (days)” and “Inactivity (%)” for balances from $10–25 up to $750–1,000
  • A formula: ActivityScore = 1 − InactivityRate
  • A descending list of Claim Incentive Factors (0.90 → 0.08)
  • A final derived output: EstimatedClaimants = ActivityScore × IncentiveFactor

The conclusion drawn from this model:

Balances below $25 will have <5% claim participation and should therefore be “reasonably classified as dust.”

This looks rigorous on the surface — but collapses immediately under scrutiny:

5.1 The definition of inactivity is extremely blunt

You define inactivity as:

“0 transactions in 12 months across all EVM chains.”

This interpretation ignores the reality that many users:

  • Used that wallet only for Radiant
  • Stopped DeFi activity after the exploit
  • Simply waited quietly for remediation
  • Do not transact often in DeFi generally
  • May have shifted activity to L2s, bridging solutions, or non-EVM environments

None of these behavioral patterns indicate:

  • Disinterest
  • Abandonment
  • Relinquishment of claims

You are measuring transaction silence, not claim probability, and then presenting it as if one proves the other.

It does not.

The metric is inappropriate for the conclusion drawn.

5.2 The “Incentive Factor” is arbitrary and structurally biased against small wallets

The proposed multipliers:

  • 0.90 for $750–1,000
  • 0.80 for $500–750
  • 0.65 for $250–500
  • 0.50 for $100–250
  • 0.35 for $50–100
  • 0.20 for $25–50
  • 0.08 for $10–25

…have no empirical justification whatsoever.

They are not based on:

  • Historical Radiant claim events
  • Equivalent protocol data
  • User research
  • Market behavior
  • On-chain analytics

They appear to be coefficients chosen specifically to:

  • Depress small-wallet estimated claimant rates
  • Inflate the narrative that “dust ≤ $25 won’t claim”
  • Justify excluding them or delaying them indefinitely

This is not a model — it’s a desired outcome wrapped in the appearance of quantitative analysis.

5.3 The underlying dataset is not published — the community is asked to trust an opaque black box

The model includes:

  • Median inactivity days
  • Percentage of wallets inactive

…but does not disclose:

  • Any addresses
  • Any raw data
  • The snapshot used
  • The query or method used to derive inactivity
  • Tranche distributions
  • Data sources
  • Visualization or scripts
  • A Dune dashboard

Without the inputs, the outputs cannot be audited, verified, or trusted.

The DAO is being asked to vote on remediation cuts based on invisible data.

That is unacceptable.

5.4 Even if inactivity statistics were real, they do NOT justify excluding victims ex-ante

Even if your inactivity percentages were correct (unproven), a foundational ethical question remains:

Is Radiant comfortable telling a hack victim:

“Your balance was small, so we assumed you wouldn’t claim and deprioritized you accordingly”?

That is not “treasury efficiency.” That is convenience over accountability.

A fair and ethical remediation process would:

  1. Give every wallet an equal claim window (6–12 months).

  2. Communicate clearly and publicly across all channels.

  3. Roll back unclaimed funds afterward, not before.

  4. Avoid pre-emptively removing entire victim tranches.

This is the standard across the industry. Radiant is attempting to do the opposite.

  1. The ambiguity of “we” continues to obscure responsibility

Even after the Telegram clarification, the term “we” is still used to blur the line between:

  • The Community Council
  • Radiant leadership / admins
  • DAO token holders

For something this sensitive — hack remediation — the authorship cannot be vague.

The CC should explicitly state:

  • “We, the Community Council, wrote this proposal.”
  • Or: “We are presenting this on behalf of the DAO.”
  • Or: “This is our recommendation as facilitators, not a mandate.”

Instead, the ambiguity persists, which allows responsibility to be shifted fluidly depending on criticism.

This is not transparency — this is insulation.

  1. The entire process feels self-serving, not community-serving

A temp-check that:

  • changes on the fly
  • retains old votes despite material edits
  • funnels directly into Snapshot
  • uses “data models” that disadvantage small wallets
  • redefines dust thresholds retroactively
  • delays already approved remediation
  • frames objections as misunderstanding
  • edits wording but not substance
  • announces changes only in Telegram, not in-poll
  • continues pushing forward as if nothing is wrong

…is not a community-driven process.

It is a top-down maneuver wrapped in the appearance of governance.

And the community can see it.

  1. The deletion of Hung’s earlier reply in the Community page only worsens the perception of a controlled narrative

When a governance-relevant reply is:

  • posted publicly
  • then deleted
  • then replaced with a different version on Telegram

It signals:

  • Revisionism
  • Narrative management
  • Lack of transparency

In governance, edits require versioning — not removal.

This is another reason the entire survey process feels managed, not democratic.

  1. Final Statement — The Process Itself Is the Problem

Even if the content of Survey-107 were reasonable (it isn’t), the process by which it is being pushed:

  • violates governance norms
  • undermines trust
  • hides authorship alignment/affiliation
  • mixes messaging between Telegram and the forum
  • amends proposals mid-vote
  • continues the vote regardless
  • positions Snapshot as an inevitable next step
  • disregards previously approved remediation timelines
  • and structurally disadvantages small wallets

This is why the the survey feels like it is just a formality — a procedural ritual designed to give legitimacy to a pre-chosen outcome.

If Radiant wants governance credibility, it needs to:

  • Withdraw Survey-107
  • Publish a new, clean version
  • Open a real discussion period
  • Restart the vote
  • Acknowledge that Q4 2025 remediation commitments will not be met
  • Provide transparent treasury data
  • State clearly who is proposing what and why

Until then, the process remains fundamentally compromised and void of any standard DAO norms.

16

If the proposal gets rejected, it just becomes one tranche instead of seven, basically just one row in the table. It’s not a big deal on the portal. If the community voted for 3 tranches, then it’s 3 rows. There is no reason to read that much into it. It was just easier to deploy something then nothing at this point. Since the claim contracts were just added anyway.

All the things you’ve asked for are already in progress. There’s no conspiracy, everything just takes time. The survey process will be restarted. I personally was dealing with the forum crashing yesterday after a failed Discourse update.

We would seriously appreciate help, so if you are interested contributing to the new survey please pm me.
I can send you the raw data used in the proposal, and also a list of all DAO assets, it’s really not a problem.

Anyway, I’m closing this survey for now until a new one is posted.

18

Hey elpharaoh,

Thanks for taking the time and energy to make this thoughtful post. A couple of things:

  1. A discourse system update inadvertently deleted 3 posts or so, including my response to your first post, that you are referring to. Nothing nefarious has taken place, and I can see how it could be read that way, especially if seen with a critical eye, looking for something that might not be there… That post is added back at the end of this post for reference.

  2. You are right to be critical of the council not revisiting the issue earlier. It could have been handled better. That’s on the council. We will strive to do better. It is our first attempt at a protocol turnaround; mistakes have been made. Rest assured, they are mistakes of the hand and not of the heart. It is a hard and thankless job, and we have also just implemented a second round of salary reductions to the team, since the exploit. Other than the TVL growth, there isn’t much good news going around atm. Please keep this in mind so we don’t demotivate the remaining team, who are actually doing an amazing job if you are willing to zoom out a bit and reassess.

  3. This survey is kind of a straw vote, nothing too official, since the votes aren’t token-gated nor is it token-weighted. It is meant to inform what the on-chain version might be. We can add another cycle and run another survey for some incremental gain that might not be worth the extra time. We are open to doing that, of course. Another way to do this, since we are late getting traction with this, we could declare the changes and ask folks to re-vote, as we attempted. Let’s be on the safe side and rerun it as a new survey.

Lots of moving pieces, and if you’re going to focus on looking for the negative narratives to hammer the community-elected council, working hard and creatively for no guaranteed ROI (some of us have lost much from the exploit), you can certainly come up with them, as we have witnessed.

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Reposting that system-deleted post on 12/1/25, as a reply to @elpharaoh 's original post (was also shared as a reply to his duplicate TG message, and it is still up).

Hi friend. Appreciate your input, and it is certainly a touchy subject, to be sure.

The founding core members have moved on after establishing the annually elected community council (CC). So, the CC is charged with running the project as prescribed by the true community DAO through its ratified proposals. This includes revisiting decisions that have been made when assumptions are off and/or material changes in the market dictate. So, if “we” is used, sometimes it means “we, the community” and sometimes it means “we, the facilitating CC”

Remediating the convenience class timely during this market will likely send the protocol into an unrecoverable tailspin, while progress is actually being seen in the marketplace (TVL rebounding from 3m to 20m…). It is hard, but try not to judge every temp-check/survey option for its own merit, what’s fair or what’s mathing/not mathing. Some can be just fodder that are a little “outside of the box” and likely to be explicitly shot down, but should not be excluded from consideration preemptively. The natural pruning process will produce a more stable and agreeable snapshot version for ratification.

:mega: UPDATES TO THIS POST (not in the actual survey area)

:ballot_box: EVERYONE, PLEASE REVIEW THE UPDATES DOCUMENTED HERE AND REVOTE AS DESIRED.

  1. The post title is changed to be more intuitive

  2. Added: “NOTE: Voting for Options 1, 2, 3, and 4 will also approve for unclaimed funds to be rolled over and made available to the next tranche. And in the case of the last tranche, unclaimed funds after 90 days of being made available will be returned to the treasury/OpEx.”

  3. All references to “dust” in the post that are outside of the actual survey area (can’t change option wording after voting started) were changed to “eligibility threshold”

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