RFP (Idea): Resolution for Inadequate v2 UI (1-Click-Loop)

Posting as a draft to request feedback on the proposal, guidance from the Radiant team on costs, and which Option to send to voting.


Upon launch of Radiant v2, the looping function was not adequately informative. The text displayed on the site did not give a fair overview of the actions that the contract call would undertake. Given that several high value deposits were made while the UI was in this state, and that those who deposited via the 1-Click-Loop function account for a large part of Radiant v2’s TVL, it would benefit all parties to compensate those affected in a manner that keeps them aligned with the protocol, while also making amends for the unfairly displayed UI upon launch.


Radiant v2 makes use of a mechanism whereby you must lock 5% of your deposited value as dLP (an 80/20 RDNT-ETH Balancer Pool Token) for a minimum of 1 month. This mechanism is in place to protect against mercenary capital, as only those with a significant positive stake in RDNT’s future price are able to farm RDNT emissions.

Radiant v2 has a 1-Click-Loop function, which, if used with the default 4x leverage setting, will take your deposit and loop it in Radiant. 5% of the new leveraged deposit (20% of your initial deposit!) is borrowed in ETH, single-sided deposited into the Balancer pool, and locked.

There are a number of issues with the 1-Click-Loop function, listed below:

The top line of the UI suggests that it’s explaining what the 1-Click-Loop function does: ‘Earn yield on a greater collateral value with up to 5x leverage through an automated process that repeats the borrow and deposit cycle multiple times’. This is what looping means elsewhere, including on Radiant v1, and therefore taking this explanation at face value can be considered sensible.

There was no mention on the UI that the function would do anything more than borrow ETH to maintain eligibility for emissions. The wording being ‘This function borrows ETH to maintain eligibility for emissions. However, if you already have enough locked dLP, you will not need to borrow’. The implication here is that you can either borrow ETH (presumably to contribute more towards the protocol’s fees and reduce your ability to be mercenary capital), OR own a locked dLP.

There is no ability to set a slippage tolerance, which would have given some indication that a swap was occurring and allowed the user to double check what was happening. Regardless, this is extremely dangerous, and in my particular case it caused an immediate $200k+ loss via price impact with no ability to mitigate the loss. An unintended $1.1M+ locked market buy is bad enough, but into a $10MM 80/20 pool with a 20% price impact that was immediately arbitraged away is beyond painful when it’s due to a misleading and inadequate front-end.

It’s important to note that many of those who have been most affected by this are seasoned DeFi veterans (SifuVision, chud.eth, RiffRaff, to name a few), not just naive market participants. This lends further credence to the notion that the UI was misleading to the point of compensation being warranted.


The rationale for this proposal is twofold:

Firstly, it is clear that the UI was not up to par in being adequately informative, as evidenced by the negative sentiment towards the issue seen across Twitter, Discord, and Telegram, as well as the fact that significant changes needed to be made afterwards to clarify what the function does. A mistake was made, and making things right where that’s the case is the way to build a good reputation within the space. Protocols that have solidified positions as stalwarts of the DeFi space have always done right by their mistakes when they have occurred, which has surely contributed to their staying power and continued success. The Radiant team has since provided further clarity with a required tick-box that explains the actions taken within the transaction as soon as they were made aware of the issue, so the number of people affected by the misleading UI was limited by their swift and prompt action on that front.

Secondly, many of those affected are currently providing a large portion of Radiant v2’s TVL, which contributes to the protocol’s fees, and maintains a flywheel effect. If these users continue to feel misled and without a fair solution, then they may be less inclined to keep their funds on Radiant, and naturally maintain negative sentiment towards the protocol. The goal of Radiant v2 is to attract and maintain sticky TVL; leaving this unaddressed would achieve the opposite effect.

Key Terms

Option 1:

All participants who used the 1-Click-Loop function prior to the UI adjustments made by the Radiant team will be compensated by legal rescission - the complete reversal of the transactions in question, such that participants are left in a position where their assets and liabilities are as if they never interacted with Radiant v2.

Option 2:

All participants who used the 1-Click-Loop function prior to the UI adjustments made by the Radiant team will be compensated in vested RDNT, in a way that matches up to the price impact they incurred as a result of the UI. Put simply, this would mean that a loop into a low liquidity Balancer pool would be compensated more RDNT than the same value loop into a more liquid Balancer pool, compensating users proportionately to the impact the UI had on their position.

Option 3:

Do nothing.


A list of all 1-Click-Loop transactions prior to the UI adjustments (Radiant team matches the Github push timestamp to a given block number) is compiled.

The value of the ETH single side deposit into the Balancer pool for each loop is noted.

Option 1:

At the end of each affected user’s lock, offer OTC swaps of dLP in exchange for the corresponding amount of ETH taken by the loop function. These funds would come from the Radiant Treasury, and the Treasury would build POL by acquiring the dLP, which it could use to farm BAL via the upcoming Balancer gauge.

Option 2:

Using the block number of the loop, we can check the balance of ETH in the 80/20 Balancer pool just before the loop occurs, and therefore calculate the value of the unavoidable price impact.

This value, in RDNT tokens, is added to the 90-day vesting of each corresponding affected wallet address. The RDNT tokens would come from the DAO reserve, and can be replenished over the coming weeks with penalty fee RDNT as people make early exits.

For context, my estimated numbers show that this represents the equivalent of around 10 days of farming rewards for each address in the worst case. Quite an insignificant cost relative to the reputational value, and longevity of TVL.

Option 3:

Do nothing.

Market Parameters

RDNT price: $0.358 at time of posting.

Steps To Implement

As noted above in the Specifications


Immediate as approved and implemented.

Overall Cost

TBC by the Radiant team following the above steps; I do not have the exact timestamp that the UI was changed, etc. However, rough maths indicates that it would be no more than $500k worth of RDNT for option 2.

Option 1 would depend heavily on the RDNT/ETH price at the time of execution.

I trust that given the parameters above, the Radiant team is able to assist by giving an indication of the definitive costs of undertaking each option.

totally agree. I also lost money from this deceptive UI… something should be done about it


I am an extremely experienced yield farmer and was also effected by this. The UI was very unclear, I believed I had to borrow ETH in order to qualify for RDNT emissions. I was NOT aware that 80% of this ETH would be swapped to RDNT and LP’d and locked away. It’s clear the Radiant team is aware the UI was completely misleading and has now taken steps to change it, but the damage has already been done to users like myself. I believe Option 1 is a fair resolution.


Unable to edit the post, but following feedback from the Radiant team RE: No ETH in the treasury:

For completeness, substitute the ETH used in Option 1 for its ARB equivalent. This is just so that Option 1 is technically feasible and can be discussed. My personal feeling is that Option 2 is a fair, middle ground option. However, as others above have expressed a preference for Option 1, using ARB instead of ETH makes it technically feasible and able to be debated.

Option 2 remains unchanged and is feasible as it has always been, as it uses RDNT.

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Investing in a brand new protocol the day it launches is always a high risk / high reward proposition. These “seasoned DeFi veterans” always show up in the first few minutes to suck the high APY%'s and walk away with millions of profits,

when occasionally things don’t go their way, they have the audacity to ask for hand outs, you are everything that’s wrong with DeFi, already trying to act like “too big to fail” moral hazards of traditional finance, if you are so concerned with risk management, wait a couple of days to see what’s happening in a protocol, don’t be lured in with the 10,000% APY’s of being there in the first few seconds at launch…

And if being super early in the hopes of astronomical profits causes you some problems, be a man enough to suck up the loss and move on. Don’t write a thinly veiled threat and try to extort more money from the community, shame on you.

Radiant team will be extremely generous and naive to compensate these yield farming maniacs, maybe if they adjust their tone and shamelessly greedy attitude a little bit, a middle ground can be reached as the UI was truly not informative enough at first…

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I didn’t invest, and the UI didn’t tell me it was investing, or taking any directional exposure. That much has been agreed upon across many participants and third party onlookers with nothing to gain or lose. In my post, I commended the swift addition of further information by the Radiant team, also…

There was no hope of astronomical profits… just a hope that my transaction would execute as the function was described on the UI. Nothing more, nothing less.

Where is the threat? I think you’re mistaken, willing to clarify anywhere that you’ve misinterpreted, as no threat was intended, genuinely.

A middle ground has been suggested with option 2, which compensates for the price impact, but retains the risk related to RDNT price exposure for the duration of the lock - happy to hear your suggestion if you’re willing to be constructive here.

your first option is too much. It takes all risks away from you if rdnt falls more. The other one is good compromise. Radiant v2 website was definitely not good enough before if we have ambitions at being the top lending protocol in crypto so something should be given at least to acknowledge that. If it was aave with this kind of website i think they would not do nothing for these users.

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Your proposal is not objective to some key facts, and therefore not thorough in my opinion.

For months, the Radiant DAO has been discussing v2, and the move away from “free lunches” (letting anyone farm emissions in the money market) and transitioning to dLP.

This was discussed in governance, Medium articles, Twitter, Discord, and Telegram.


It’s not that you missed one tweet, you missed dozens of communications from the DAO over the course of months.

Anyone can do their research and verify this.
Check Radiant Capital – Medium.
Check dao.radiant.capital (specifically RFP-4)
Check the Twitter timeline.
Check the Discord announcement history.

The fact that you were looping and expecting to get RDNT emissions without dLP means it’s very likely you were not an informed user, an active and contributing member of the DAO and protocol, and have in all likelihood acted with a high degree of negligence.

Which makes it likely that in v1 you were farming and dumping Radiant. And coming back to do it again. The very reason v2 came into existence.

You are the mercenary farmer that v2 was built to safeguard against.

And you didn’t do your own research before aping.

I think most users would have seen that warning message and at least thought to look into it more. I think you were conditioned in v1 to how looping worked then and expected it to be the same.

Harsh lesson. You have my sympathy, but not my support.

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I support compensation from the treasury in vested RDNT. I like the protocol and believe in its long-term growth and stability, and it seems a small price to pay to make everyone whole.


Thanks for the feedback. One thing I will note, though, is that the warning message you speak of was not present in the initial UI. That’s the point of the proposal.

and, FWIW, I hardly used v1, so painting the picture of me farming and dumping in v1 just to fit a narrative of me being an enemy of the DAO isn’t objective - looping means looping everywhere else as well, not just Radiant v1. I think it’d be more productive if we drop the assumptions that I’m some evil mercenary farmer and stick to facts here. More than happy to have constructive conversations around a path forward, but if people are going to paint a story of intentions and motives without relevant facts, and then talk about a lack of objectivity in the same breath, then those biases need to be pointed out. Let me know.

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Actually there was always a warning message. Was it modified to be more clear? Yes. Was there always a warning message? Also yes.

There wasn’t a warning message RE: any directional exposure being taken. Just a notice that ETH would be borrowed. I get that you think that’s enough, but that is the extent of any message showed.

Let’s stick to facts, please.

If you want to prove that you weren’t farming + dumping in v1- share your impacted wallet address. Happy to have my assumptions be proven wrong. What you allege occurred points strongly to the opposite being true.

And again, back to facts- If you had written an objective proposal, I would have had no reason to point out you purposefully omitted relevant information such as consistent messaging from the DAO regarding the transition to the dLP requirement. Thus not holding yourself accountable for negligence of your own funds. If you can’t move past this fact, then your case is weakened.

And if you were aware of that you would have never bothered looping, since you would have known you would be earning no emissions without dLP.

Right, I think I can sense the source of hostility now. Hopefully can address below:

‘If you had written an objective proposal, I would have had no reason to point out you purposefully omitted relevant information such as consistent messaging from the DAO regarding the transition to the dLP requirement.’

I actually have no issue or objection with this - I haven’t said at all that the information was not out there, somewhere. I understand that it likely was communicated in Discord, Twitter, etc. leading up to the launch. However, I don’t think you can assume that users will follow every medium of update for months prior to launch, and I think that the UI on launch still should have better reflected what was happening.

‘And if you were aware of that you would have never bothered looping, since you would have known you would be earning no emissions without dLP.’

Actually, if @GeorgeMacallan doesn’t mind me sharing private DMs with him, I can show that in my first message to him on 19/03/23 I noted that I do really like the tokenomics at play, and this is why I take objection to the projection of intentions. Honestly, I think it’s a great solution to a sustainable platform. My issue is that the UI didn’t adequately inform what was happening. If it had, would I have gone to the Balancer pool first so I didn’t get hit with >$200k of instant price impact because there was no indication of directional exposure? Yes. This is why, in option 2, I propose the middle ground of only making the price impact whole. This binds affected users to the terms of the lock, but simulates complete information whereby they would have been able to scale in slowly without the egregious price impact that the function caused.

This is also why I propose that the RDNT is vested - to align users with the protocol, and incentivize stickier TVL.

I hope that clears up a few of the misconceptions you may have had. Happy to go into anything deeper, or any other points of contention.

Why would you think there was no directional exposure to RDNT in building the LP? Even if one didn’t do due diligence on said LP, wouldn’t one at least think there might be some exposure?

2 things that headlined v2 and were DAO approved, well-published, and discussed ad nauseam for months:

  1. Ending single-sided lock RDNT and offer 80% exposure in #2
  2. BAL 80/20 LP pool replacing the Sushi 50/50 LP pool
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There was no mention of the transaction building an LP in the original UI. The extent of the original UI’s messaging was that it would borrow ETH if you did not have locked dLP. I don’t think it’s unreasonable to interpret that at face value. Would be great if you could post the two versions of the UI (I can’t, no permissions), so that this point can be illustrated. I have copies I can share via Discord, if you need them.

Yes, as my previous reply states, I understand that it was discussed elsewhere, I am not contesting that. My issue, shared by somewhere around 10% of currently locked dLP by my estimations, is that the UI on which you interact and complete the transaction, did not adequately inform what would occur.

> Launched on 3/18/23 10:42 PM ET

Modified UI - Announced 3/20/23 4:18 PM ET

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this picturs should be in original post. it explains everything about the problem.

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5% of deposits in dLP is a well-established pre-requisite for emission eligibility. If the connection isn’t made from “Notice: This function borrows ETH to maintain eligibility for emissions. However, if you already have enough locked dLP, you will not need to borrow”, the due diligence effort fell short of what was needed for such a decision. I think you could take ownership of this.