RFP 3: Improve RDNT On-Chain Liquidity for v2 - Fund Allocation

lets do it

I was reading your post, and one way to mitigate the issue you expose is to provide a % of current Pool2 emissions to LP lockers. This way you will get an additional income that will absolutely cover the tax events you mention.

Today Pool2 Emissions: RDNT/WETH → 90% apr
Locking Rdnt → 50% apr (43% hard assets)

New scenario
Locking RDNT/WSTETH → 50% apr + 30% pool2

In simple you would cut 2/3 emissions of pool2, generating positive price action on RDNT, and reward LP holders better, dealing with potential IL and some aditional revenues to cover extra expenses.

Also, instead of cutting single locking, you could use 1/3 of pool2 emissiones for single stakers (Still 30% APR). and reduce 1/3 emissions of pool2. That way you allow both mechanisms.

Also it is important to mention that this proposal is to address the liquidity issues we have right now, where a couple 30k sales can generate 3-4% price impact or even more.

Regards!

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Not a fan of the single staking going away. Right now is what’s keeping me from selling the RDNT I get from using the protocol, because I believe it will go up in the future but also earn real yield with it in a simple manner. I completely understand LP being more valuable from the protocol POV, but saying RDNT single staking users don’t bring value feels like a slap in the face. I do wish the best for Radiant because I’m a huge believer and if this is what the community wants so be it, but if single staking goes away, I would not see the value of using this protocol myself.

My broad view is this proposal needs additional work.

CONCERNS
My concerns with this proposal are:

  1. Long-termism and lock
    This proposal doesn’t address long-term participation. Eg by offering a sliding scale of locking from 2 weeks to 4 years.

With this proposal there is no lock at all to participation as currently provided, whereas in partnership with Balancer there is the possibility to implement a ve80/20 model with long-term locking and gauges to vote on emissions to markets combining Euler UX and a solution to the low-float-high-FDV problem.

  1. 40% income doesn’t overcome 50/50 IL
    In the BSC example the protocol income of 40% doesn’t compensate for the IL in a 50-50 vs a hold-and-do-nothing strategy. Ie therefore, it incentivises no participation at all on BSC compared to hodl strategy, so will likely need high emissions again to compensate.

  2. Chain fee inconsistency
    This proposal means that every chain launched needs its own LP, and Balancer 80-20 isn’t supported everywhere. Furthermore, it means that the income streams on some chains will differ from others.

QUERY
Query:

  1. Does the protocol income flow/compound in the pool or is it claimable outside the LP pool?

You stake the LP and claim outside I presume, in which case it is not possible to tax efficiently compound.

  1. Can team RDNT be used to vote on DAO proposals?

VISION REQUIRED
Personally, I would prefer a proposal or communication that:

  1. Outlined the complete omnichain vision including 80/20 everywhere, ve80/20, cross chain fee sharing, long-term locking, voting gauges ala Euler etc
  2. Then, this proposal can be placed within that broader vision. Because as it stands, this looks quite ad hoc and its not clear where the omnichain vision is going from a proposal that splits up fee sharing, asks investors to incur 50/50 IL but doesn’t compensate with RDNT rewards etc.

Eg there just been a 2+ month lift to build a DAO forum that depends on locked RDNT, but now locking is being removed completely in this proposal. So whats the vision.

FYI this article is good at explaining 80/20 IL vs 50/50 IL: 80/20 Balancer Pools. One of the main motivations behind… | by Fernando Martinelli | Balancer Protocol | Medium

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We need to leave a single RDNT pool to get the protocol fees. It’s a terrible idea to convert stakers to LPs. Strongly against this idea. Let’s let the stakers be the stakers and LP’s be the LP’s.

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I also believe that creating liquidity silos is a bad play, on all timeframes. There are several cross-chain solutions being utilized now, like Layer0 or Axelar. If RDNT is movin.g to other chains to take advantage of composability w/ other deFi dapps, then utilizing a cross-chain relayer may be the most efficient option in reducing fractured liquidity.

Please consider the wbnb:rdnt as an independent RFP

I believe the veTokenomics could be replaced with a Time Based Tokenomics strategy. Essentially, the ve model, but time staked is weighted for earnings %. User may unstake at leisure, but once unstaked the time-bonus is dropped to 0. This encourages a longer stake, but also the freedom to manage your position.

Article on veTokenomics and Alternatives: Tokenomics Musings: ve tokens and alternatives — 0xKepler 🔭

Providing Liquidity has a different risk/reward profile compared to staking, and allows token holders to refine their portfolio distribution to suit their appetite for risk.

Staked / Locked tokens (non-LP), although yes not as much ’ skin in game ’ as LPers, also provide a low effort ’ vote of confidence '.

Important to recognize this in addition to LP’ers imo, as not everyone desires / wishes / or possesses the skillset to LP.

Can you comment on wstETH how to get it? Risks involved with it etc…?

stETH is simply staked eth through Lido. wstETH is the wrapped version of eth that is available on arbitrum/optimism. You can swap for it through 1inch, uniswap, and other places. This will help explain the mechanism to it.

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