Abstract
As Radiant Capital approaches its two-year anniversary and prepares for the launch of Radiant v3, it is critical that the DAO repositions itself organizationally in a way that mitigates many of the ‘growing pains’ other businesses experience, both in the TradFi and DeFi industries. It’s impossible to mitigate all pain-points due to:
- The complex and dynamic nature of Radiant Capital’s business and lofty ever-changing goals;
- The fact that certain aspects of the inner workings of Radiant Capital are protected under a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) with a previous investor (Binance Labs);
- The high-velocity nature of the space that Radiant Capital operates within (and how fast protocols in this space can/should innovate);
We, the non-commissioned members of the DAO (i.e. ‘volunteers’), who serve only for the purpose to better Radiant Capital for all users and team members and not just select insiders, feel Radiant Capital is at a crossroads and has a unique opportunity to reposition itself as a trusted protocol for participants of all kinds through a series of democratic decisions that build trust and respect between all stakeholders. The creation of a community council will act as a liaison for the full spectrum of users, from the smallest holder to the most senior team leaders. To achieve the goal of winning the hearts and minds of the broader community and subsequently growing the community exponentially, we the people that have supported Radiant Capital through many successes and failures believe that a bold, new strategy to radically transform transparency, fiscal responsibility, and collaboration, will dramatically accelerate and improve the already stellar macro-vision that the official DAO council members and advisors have set forth.
The purpose of this potential proposal is to establish a small, secondary, community-led council charged with collaboratively outlining new democratic procedures and processes for governance including but not limited to: voting processes and vote weighting, required transparency around key initiatives that do not jeopardize Radiant Capital’s legal obligations, establishing a “secondary council” as a “branch” of the Radiant Capital “legislative” system for the purpose of understanding market sentiment, expert peer review, eliminating bias/misleading or incomplete messaging, and requiring significantly more research and data analysis as a SOP (‘standard operating procedure’) inclusion in RFPs that reach formal snapshot voting.
“Audentes fortuna iuvat” is a latin phrase that translates to a “fortune favors the bold”
This is a call to create a secondary community-led council as a genesis moment, with the first order of business to collaborate with the existing DAO council on a formalized council proposal (RFP XX) to improve the key issues above, and beyond.
We seek to freely elect a small group to lead this new “community council”, through a democratic snapshot “election” with extremely short limits to the time they can serve their fellow Radiant constituents without being freely re-elected to ensure the interests of the community are always held at a level requisite to the value the community brings, and the importance of the community to the greater success of Radiant Capital.
Recently, DAO council respect of community popular opinion and feedback has been diminished to levels not in-line with the community’s value to the ecosystem.
In addition, should this community council be created and ratified, elected members will be strictly volunteer positions with zero financial compensation, albeit with future opportunities for performance-based compensation (“bonuses for vast improvements”) to be voted on, but never guaranteed.
Radiant dLPs are the foundation of the protocol, providing long-term liquidity vital for its success. While there are several other considerations, many of which should be carefully deliberated by economic experts before being set forth to any vote, the ethos of this potential proposal is to establish a new culture of honesty, empathy, and true democracy, with the goal of catapulting Radiant Capital to the forefront of DeFi as the current team and council already desires. At the center of this objective lies the DLP lockers, the lifeblood of the protocol.
“Sine qua non” is another latin phrase which translates to “an absolutely necessary ingredient.” The “people” made up of enthusiasts, investors, members, and even current team and council members, can all agree on one thing: democratic harmony is the sine qua non of advancing a new paradigm where “Situazione vantaggiosa per tutti” (“win-win situations) materialize.
Motivation
Radiant Capital has grown to achieve several milestones in a relatively short amount of time, notably achieving respectable scale (#1 money market on Arbitrum), expanding distribution (expansions to Binance Chain and Ethereum Mainnet), and acquiring outside funding ($10M investment from Binance Labs), to name a few. As organizations grow, so do exciting opportunities as well as frustrating challenges.
In light of a recent proposal, RFP-33, which has been widely considered the most polarizing proposal, at best, and most infuriating proposal, at worst, a large contingent of community members, many with quite sophisticated and experienced professional backgrounds including some within the crypto industry (and some who have invested six to seven figures in Radiant), have been vocal about concerns regarding a few key elements of the RFP:
- The communication, or lack thereof, about the proposal prior to the DAO council approving it for an immediate vote.
- The short duration (“time limit”) of the vote, which many feel disenfranchises many voters, particularly voters with less voting power.
- The vote weight of 3rd party “optimizers” such as Radpie, which did not have a quorum for their own internal vote, and only secured approximately ~$300,000 of voting power on the Radpie platform while carrying voting power of ~13M RDNT in the Radiant DAO vote, essentially swaying the vote singlehandedly with disproportionate power.
- The lack of transparency surrounding the use of funds in a vote “FOR” RFP-33, with only vague expenditures such as [but not limited to] and undisclosed amount “supporting future contributors.”
- Absence of up-to-date data shared about the current economic runway for RDNT emissions as well as future projections based on the need for emissions for future assets and chains.
- Absence of mathematical and data-driven rationalization for the potential net-positive impact of such an inflationary measure.
- Absence of illustration of the current runway to achieve the goals in previously passed RFPs. For example, with the current treasury balance, how long can RDNT emissions remain competitive before a shortfall while still launching the ratified initiatives (i.e. “RIZ” emissions requirements over X period of time).
- The requirement of a subsequent RFP to further ratify implementation (a major pain point amongst the community has been the concept of agreeing to something, without a complete execution plan included in the same RFP, not a speculative future RFP).
- Concerns about other ‘insiders’ with disproportionate voting power swaying voting results in a direction that does not serve the broader user base or economic health of the protocol.
- The Radiant v3 RFP made no mention of future inflation/dilution as a “cost” of the proposal in order for it to be executed successfully. This leads many to believe that either the v3 plan was not well thought out and could have benefitted from outside expert consultants, or the DAO council was indeed aware of this but failed to mention it in the Radiant v3 RFP. Either scenario paints a very troubling picture and could have been prevented with basic oversight measures.
- The Arbitrum STIP campaign aggressively aimed to onboard new long term DLP lockers with brilliant marketing but unspectacular compensation on a relative APR basis. Diluting brand new lockers through the ratification of RFP-33 may create significant FUD from these specific market participants, who might argue that not disclosing the potential for dilution borders on fraudulent and manipulative behavior.
While the current governance format has done an admirable job getting Radiant to where it is today, for continued exponential growth, it is the position of the Radiant community that new checks and balances, safe guards, and additional democratic processes within reason be implemented swiftly to protect the protocol that we all loved at one point.
Disenfranchisement and/or Unethical Voting Practices on RFP-33
RFP-33 was designed to stimulate growth, capture market share, and above all, increase value to all stakeholders of Radiant Capital. While it is nearly unanimous that further incentives need to be implemented to achieve the protocol’s lofty goals effectively, there is growing frustration that Radiant has outgrown its v1 and v2 governance voting process.
With the rise of “optimizers” like Radpie, Plutus, etc, and that a small number of unverified/un-doxxed wallets hold a disproportionate amount of votes without being able to adequately trace that the origins of their RDNT holdings are non-nefarious or not votes within Radiant’s council or investor group, concepts like maximum voting power should be considered, to make the process more democratic.
Lack of Detail, Data, and Data-Driven Economic Projections and Policies in RFPs
It is of the opinion of the community leaders that such consequential decisions should allow every participant the opportunity to review in great detail the possible ramifications on critical decisions, such as those posed in RFP-33. One of the key goals of the community council is to ensure that data scientists and, more importantly, economists, peer review policy before it makes it to a formal vote.
Ethical Explanation of Risks and Rewards of All Outcomes Within the RFPs
Current RFPs are written with what is perceived as extreme bias, and fails to highlight the inherent risks, which undoubtedly exist. Understanding risk is a basic element of investing in speculative assets, and adjusting the economics with little to no mention of potential risks is fiscally irresponsible. We believe the Radiant DAO council has a fiduciary responsibility to its users to always disclose the potential risks and rewards of all potential outcomes of an RFP, which will usher in further trust in the brand and platform.
Vote Weighting
In addition to restricting voting power to a maximum (for example, 1 million per wallet, with safeguards to prevent multiple wallets owned by the same user to “game” the system), further considerations should be freely debated, such as higher weighting for long-term DLP lockers, and lower weighting for 3rd parties such as Radpie or short term DLP lockers.
Expert Opinions
Not all RFPs are created equal, but some RFPs such as RFP-33 that have far-reaching consequences, would have been prudent to engage with doxxed economic experts to submit their findings as part of the risk/reward assessment. These assessments could, and likely should, marry harmoniously with internal data based on current supply/demand curves, utilization of assets/markets, and current treasury burn rate.
Eliminating 2-Step RFPs
A repeated concern was the passage and ratification of RFP-33 with critical missing elements being pushed off until a subsequent RFP, presumed to be RFP-34. This format does a disservice to the community and creates a loss of trust amongst many, which can permeate throughout the community. As we all know, trust is hard to earn, but easy to lose.
Creating a Harmonious Relationship Between the DAO Council, Radiant’s Team and Investors, and the Community
A rare opportunity to foster a Satoshi-esque relationship for the modern world of web3 is upon us, where optimism and excitement is a byproduct of circular involvement and decision making by all relevant stakeholders with both a top-down and bottom-up approach, eliminating future lapses in executional or PR judgment.
Future Measures
The community council will serve as ongoing “checks and balances” to ensure that the broader community doesn’t feel neglected, and that controversial proposals are presented in ways that do not create negative PR or sentiment (and subsequent price action), but rather are viewed as collaborative and actually win-win for all parties. Had RFP-33 been passed through a community council prior to announcement and voting, changes could have been made that truly would have created a Situazione vantaggiosa per tutti, instead of a Situazione lo Sterco per tutti (shitty situation).
Steps to Implement
Should this concept be sufficiently reviewed and supported by the majority of all segments of the stakeholders, the community leaders who do not hold any official or unofficial position within Radiant or its council can move to deliberate the size, scope, and structure of its community council, and nominate and elect its inaugural community council. This would happen after additional review and approval from Radiant and its official DAO council. Prior to any approvals by either side, established bylaws, rights, and responsibilities will need to be negotiated, approved, and voted on by all sides in accordance with existing voting rules, with the caveat that 3rd parties and/or private investors do not have the ability to vote.
Intended Uses:
- Support democratic process that benefits the ecosystem and all its participants
- Leverage third-party experts, such as economists, for high-importance initiative research and evaluation
- Create a system of checks and balances to prevent a small number of participants from benefiting at the expense of the majority of users
- Enhance trust in the protocol to drive adoption, TVL, and ultimately asset appreciation through increased governance value
Cost
This is not a formal RFP, and thus the costs are little to none. However, if this “idea” does make it to a vote, all potential costs will be outlined in detail prior to a vote.
Timeline
Should this “idea” become an RFP, the exact details will be outlined in the RFP prior to vote, as part of the ethos of transparency.